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Rating Corporate Groups 




 This paper aims to provide a model that allows BPI to measure the credit risk, through 
its rating scale, of the subsidiaries included in the corporate groups who are their clients. This 
model should be simple enough to be applied in practice, accurate, and must give consistent 
results in comparison to what have been the ratings given by the bank. The model proposed 
includes operational, strategic, and financial factors and ends up giving one of three results: no 
support, partial support, or full support from the holding to the subsidiary, and each of them 
translates in adjustments in each subsidiary’s credit rating. As it would be expectable, most of 
the subsidiaries should have the same credit rating of its parent company. 
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BPI – Banco Português de Investimento - is a major portuguese private financial group, 
listed in the Euronext Lisbon’s PSI-20 stock index, and focused on banking businesses, 
providing financial services and products for corporate, institutional and individual customers. 
Its assets stand about 46 billion euros and it has more than 1.4 million customers in Portugal, 
Spain, Angola, and Mozambique. 
In order to get a good customer selection and to control processes, the bank needs models 
that allows it to make risk-informed decisions. These models, based on each customer credit 
profile, end up giving an objective value – credit rating - that, ultimately, corresponds to a 
probability of default. The internal ratings go from E1 to E10, with the first corresponding to 
the best case – lower probability of default, and so lower credit risk. In the current paper, a 
‘notch below’ is actually one value above in the rating scale, i.e., one position worse: for 
example one notch below E5 is E6. The opposite reasoning applies to ‘notch above’. 
According to Basel II, an Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach must incorporate both 
historical and empirical evidence. However when we get to Low Default Portfolios (LDP), the 
analysis seem complicated – the historical number of defaults is insufficient for the traditional 
back-testing analysis and for any econometric estimative. Hand in hand with this, BPI is still in 
need to improve the way it rates the subsidiaries regarding the intragroup relationships when 
the whole group presents consolidated financial statements, and that is the main focus of this 
paper. In fact, does it make sense to have different credit ratings inside a group if in case of 
financial distress they will support each other? What if they have completely different credit 
risk on a stand-alone basis? Is a subsidiary always guaranteed by the group’s performance? All 
these questions are discussed in the following chapters. Note that the terms parent company and 
holding are considered interchangeable throughout this paper. 
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The present report starts with a summarized and brief analysis of what is done in this matter 
by the leading rating companies in the world - DBRS, Fitch, Standard & Poor’s, and Moody’s. 
Given the impact of these rating agencies on the institutions and the countries themselves all 
over the world, the way they link the holdings and the subsidiaries’ ratings is an important 
starting point to any model we want to create. As such, we then get into the design of a new 
model proposal for BPI on how to assess subsidiaries’ ratings based on their relationship with 
the parent company. This relationship will be analysed at different levels – financially, 
operationally, and strategically. After designing it, it comes a chapter where we apply that new 
model to groups already rated by BPI in order to test the results and compare them with what 
is being done. This model analysis is particularly important to ensure rating consistency, which 
is a decisive characteristic of risk analysis. Finally, we make some conclusions about the 
accuracy and practicability of the proposed model, based on the model analysis chapter, as well 
as possible inherent limitations found along the work. 
 
II. Literature Review 
The relationship between the ratings of a holding company and their subsidiaries is an 
unavoidable topic of all institutions that provide credit to other companies because it allows to 
understand how likely to default a company is taking into account the group where it belongs. 
Throughout this chapter we will attempt to explore the different ways to analyse it, carried out 
by the four biggest rating agencies in the world – DBRS, Fitch, Standard & Poor’s, and 
Moody’s. 
DBRS 
DBRS criteria for rating holding companies and their subsidiaries released in September 
2012 considers that, as long as there are consolidated financial statements and unless there are 
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ring-fencing constrains, both the parent and the subsidiaries must have the same credit rating, 
based on the group’s predominant sector of activity and the DBRS’s methodology. In case of 
ring-fencing, the stand-alone credit profile is considered. 
Fitch 
In order to assess parent and subsidiary rating linkage, Fitch evaluates whether there are 
strong legal, operational, and strategic ‘ties’. The following scheme (Figure I) summarizes the 
whole process. 
 
Figure I – Linkage Considerations Framework Outline1 
                                                          




Standard & Poor’s 
S&P includes the impact of a parent’s rating on the subsidiaries’ rating by evaluating the 
incentive that the first has to support each of the subsidiaries when they are in financial distress. 
This willingness to help is based on whether the subsidiary is strategically important for the 
parent. As such, S&P characterizes the subsidiaries as core, highly strategic, strategically 
important, moderately strategic, or nonstrategic. To assess the group status of each group 
member, the rating agency takes into account different factors, such as percentage of ownership, 
ability to give financial support, sharing the same name and/or brand (and so reputational risks), 
track record of subsidiary’s performance, operational and strategic integration, whether there 
are agreements or any source of obligation for the parent to provide financial support, among 
others. Table I summarizes the impact that each classification has on parent’s and subsidiaries’ 
ratings.  
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Less integral to the group than highly strategic subsidiaries. The rest 
of the group is likely to provide additional liquidity, capital, or risk 
transfer in most foreseeable circumstances. However, some factors 
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transfer support from the rest of the group in some foreseeable 
circumstances. Nevertheless, there is potential for some support 
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Moody’s incorporates the parent-subsidiaries relationship by evaluating the ability and the 
willingness of the parent to support the subsidiary. On the first side, the holding company may 
(or may not) suffer financial problems at the same time, due to high (or low) correlation of 
business risks. On the other side, if there are reputation/brand risks, strategic fit/event risk, 
operational integration, and/or historic evidence of the parent providing support, the parent will 
be more willing to support the subsidiaries when they are in financial distress, in order to protect 
itself from contagion. After evaluating this, Moody’s adjusts the stand-alone profile ratings of 
the subsidiaries: if they are financially weak or risky businesses, they keep the stand-alone 
profile rating; if they are well established and essential to the parent, their stand-alone profile 
rating might go up for one or two notches; if they are financially, strategically, and operationally 
important to a really strong holding company, their ratings might even go up for even more than 
two notches, having the parent’s rating as a ceiling. 
 
Summing up, for most of the big rating agencies, a stand-alone profile analysis is done first 
and then they adjust the rating of the subsidiaries based on the linkage with the parent. This link 
is evaluated mainly by strategic factors, but also by operational, financial, and legal factors. 
The intent of this paper is to apply it in BPI, establishing, a priori, two extreme points where 
the subsidiary has the same rating of the holding or, in contrast, a rating based on its stand-
alone profile without any adjustments, and analysing the relationship between them to adjust 






III. Model Design 
This paper’s objective is to assess subsidiaries’ credit rating through their relationship with 
the parent company when they present consolidated financial statements. After analysing what 
is done by the leading rating agencies, we will now try to design a model for BPI. 
First of all, let us consider the extreme cases where there are total ring-fencing constrains 
or legal obligations. In the first case, since there are restricted access to cash-flows between the 
holding company and its subsidiaries, the credit risk analysis should be done separately, i.e., 
parent’s and subsidiaries’ ratings should be based on their stand-alone profiles. These constrains 
can appear directly in the form of project finance or regulations that forbid the parent company 
to influence the business and financial risk profile of the subsidiary, or it can come indirectly 
from the ownership of listed companies (thus, the parent will not want to let the subsidiary 
default given the big consequences for the group that could arise) or any type of agreement that 
makes the subsidiary independent from the parent which allows the parent to easily (no major 
consequences for the group) sell it in case of financial problems. In the second case, when the 
parent has legal obligations to provide financial support to its subsidiaries (such as debt 
guarantees), we consider that the subsidiaries should have the same rating of the holding 
company. In fact, if there are legal ties between them, they are ‘protected’ from each other’s 
performance, and so, there are no reasons to have different ratings. Moreover, BPI considers 
that as long as the holding owns 90% (or more) of a company, it has social responsibility to 
help it during financial problems. Conversely, if the holding has a participation smaller than 
50% on a subsidiary, it is not responsible for this last company, and so, the risk analysis should 
be done separately.  
Thus, the problem with this analysis arises when the linkage between the holding company 
and its subsidiaries lies somewhere in between of the afore-mentioned two extreme points, and 
the subsidiaries are detained at less than 90%. As such, the focus of this paper is to find a 
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solution to these intermediate cases. The model we propose to solve this covers several factors: 
ownership, reputation/brand risk, strategic fit, operational relevance, track record of support, 
and centralized treasury. First of all, we have the most quantifiable factor which is the 
participation of the holding company – if the parent company owns just a part of a subsidiary 
it will be less willing to give financial support than if it owns 100% of the subsidiary’s shares. 
Second, and starting with the more subjective factors, there might be reputational or brand risk 
for the holding company if the subsidiary fails, due to sharing the same name or immediate 
association of the names in the consumers’ mind. In this case, the parent will be more willing 
to give financial support to the subsidiary in order to avoid these problems. Third, if there is a 
strategic fit, through vertical integration for instance, the incentive to support the subsidiary in 
case of financial distress is higher than if they operate in different sectors. Fourth, if a subsidiary 
is responsible for a big part of the parent’s profits, there is a huge probability that the parent 
will provide help. Otherwise (for no strategic or no operational relevance), the parent company 
can decide to sell it instead of solving its problems, and so, the link between both companies is 
not significant. Fifth, we can consider that if the parent has given support to the subsidiary in 
the past, the probability of giving it again is higher. Finally, in case both companies usually get 
money from the same investors/bank or through intracompany relationships, the parent will be 
more willing to provide support because, if it allows the subsidiary to fail its payments to the 
debtholders that know who is the owner of that company, they might refuse to provide credit to 
the parent company afterwards. 
The next step is to measure the afore-mentioned factors and put them together, just so we 
can have a model to extract the credit rating of each subsidiary from the credit rating of the 
holding company or adjust its stand-alone rating given the relationship with the parent. The 
model we propose gives a weight to each of the factors, which will then be multiplied by zero, 
one or two, depending on whether the factor shows, respectively, a weak, median, or strong 
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relationship between each subsidiary and the holding company. Table II summarizes the criteria 
for this classification. 
Table II – Relationship between holding and subsidiary 
 Weak (0) Median (1) Strong (2) 
Ownership 50% ≤ Participation < 60% 60% ≤ Participation < 80% 80% ≤ Participation < 90% 
Reputational/ 
Brand Risk 
No linkage nor easy 
association of the 
names/brands. 
The names are easily 
associated although 
consequences of that can 
be managed. 
Meaningful reputational 
risks – subsidiary carries 
the holding’s name. 
Strategic Fit 
The subsidiary is not 
integrated in the holding’s 
strategy; there are no 
strategic problems in 
selling the subsidiary. 
There is some degree of 
integration but the 
consequences of losing the 
subsidiary can be managed 
without problems for the 
holding. 




Responsible for less than 
25% of the holding’s 
profits. 
Responsible for 25% to 
75% (not included) of the 
holding’s profits. 
Responsible for 75% or 
more of the holding’s 
profits. 
Track Record 
Historic evidence shows 
no support from the 
holding in case of financial 
problems. 
 
Historic evidence of 
financial support from the 




The main investors are not 
the same, although there is 
a small portion of funding 
coming from the same 
investors. 
The main investors of the 
holding and the subsidiary 
are the same. 
 
Each of the factors is weighted considering its relative importance on the model. To find 
the weights, the starting point was what Moody’s considers in its rating models3 and some 
adjustments were made to avoid big discrepancies between the result of this model and the 
ratings that the bank gave to their clients. Summing all the factors already weighted, the model 
will give a score between zero and two, where the extreme points are not included since it would 
correspond to one of the extreme cases mentioned in the beginning (no support or full support). 
Afterwards, we divide the results in three intervals – 0 to 0.5, 0.5 to 1.2, and higher than 
1.2. Since most of the subsidiaries should claim full support because otherwise it would not 
make sense to be inside the same group, the biggest interval is the one that respects to strong 
                                                          
3 Clark, J. Bruce. 2012. “The Rating Relationship Between Industrial Companies And Their Captive Finance 
Subsidiaries”. Moody’s Investors Service. 
11 
 
relationships. Keeping the same reasoning in mind, the smallest interval should be the one that 
corresponds to a weak relationship. 
Let y be the average between parent’s rating and the subsidiary’s stand-alone rating, the 
following scheme, figure II, shows the process to go from the model score to the final rating of 
the subsidiary. 
 
Figure II – From Model Score to the effective rating of the subsidiary 
 
The first result, if it is between 0 and 0.5, represents a weak relationship between them, and so, 
the rating of the subsidiary should be based on its stand-alone credit profile, although with a 
ceiling of two notches above the credit rating of the holding since there is still some risk of 
contagion in case of financial problems within the group (also the score is slightly above 0). 
Note that this ceiling is based on what the reference rating companies around the world are 
doing (see literature review). The second alternative, where the score lies between 0.5 and 1.2, 
is divided in two cases: if the subsidiary has a credit profile stronger than the parent, it should 
have the same rating of the parent; if the parent has a stronger credit profile than the subsidiary, 
the last’s credit rating should be the best between the holding’s rating plus the average of the 
Model Score
0 ≤ x < 0.5
Stand-alone rating 
(ceiling of 2 
notches)








[parent's rating + y; 






difference between their ratings and the subsidiary’s credit rating minus that same average. 
Note that when we add something to a rating we are worsen it (for example, E1 plus 1 is E2 
that has a higher probability of default), and when subtract we are improving it (for example, 
E8 minus 2 is E6 that has a lower probability of default). Note that, since the rating is an integer, 
the average is rounded up. Moreover, it is considered the difference and not a pre-defined 
number to avoid cases when the difference is lower than that pre-defined number which would 
result in a subsidiary with higher rating than the parent, even when its stand-alone profile is 
worse. We also consider average and not the difference itself to prevent high discrepancies - 
for instance if the parent is an E4 and the subsidiary an E8, and we consider the total difference, 
the rating would be the best between E4 and E8, this is, an E4 for a company that is on its own 
an E8. As such, using the average makes that company an E6 which sounds more reasonable. 
Finally, if it is above 1.2 we consider that there is a strong relationship between the holding and 
the subsidiary, and therefore they should have the same rating. 
 
IV. Model Analysis 
In order to test the model, we apply it, in this section, to eight real cases and compare the 
results with the ratings that BPI gave to those companies based on its actual model. To improve 
the accuracy of the model, we chose groups across different sectors and with different 
organizational charts. The necessary information to perform this analysis was taken from the 
group’s consolidated management reports and accounts. Moreover, the stand-alone ratings for 
the companies in the grey area were calculated by BPI with an internal algorithm. Note also 
that the real names of all the companies were hidden (substituted by letters in case of the 
holdings and numbers for the subsidiaries) due to confidentiality obligations. The tables with 
the characteristics and the results for each group are presented in appendix. 
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The first group (Holding A) belongs to the oil and gas sector and has thirteen subsidiaries 
where the percentage of capital detained by the holding lies between 50% and 90%. Except for 
one of them, they share the same characteristics in most of the factors: meaningful reputational 
risks, strategic integration, responsible for less than 25% of the holding’s EBITDA, past 
financial support received from the holding, and the same main investors. As such, the 
differentiating factor is the ownership, which is also the most important. The model score for 
most of the subsidiaries is above 1.2, meaning that they should have the same rating as the 
holding. The exceptions are subsidiary 3 which does not even share the characteristics afore-
mentioned – there is no strategic relationship nor reputational risks – and subsidiaries 4 and 8 
that, due to lower participation, have a model score lying also on the partial support. In case of 
subsidiary 3, BPI does not rate this company, and so, there is no possible comparison between 
the model and what is done. In case of subsidiary 4, it has a stand-alone rating of E2, and so, 
the model results in a final rating of E3. Finally, subsidiary 8 has a stand-alone credit rating of 
E6 which, in this model, will give a final rating of E4. BPI ratings are quite similar to the ones 
we got: most of them have the same rating as the holding, except for subsidiaries 1, 4, 8 and 9, 
with a rating one notch below the parent. 
The second group’s (Holding B) main activities are management, development and 
investment of shopping centres business, and includes twenty-two subsidiaries that need to be 
analysed. Most of them have a participation lower than 50%, meaningful reputational risks, 
strategic integration, responsibility for less than 25% of the holding’s EBITDA, have been 
supported by the holding, and share the same main investors. As such, except for one of them 
that is detained at a higher percentage and results in full support, all of the others lie in the 
partial support area. However, BPI does not have ratings for almost half of these companies – 
some of them do not have individual reports for the last years, some have zero turnover, and 
others are not clients of this bank.  For those that we can compare, just three of them have 
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different results – subsidiaries 19 and 22 have a stand-alone rating two notches below the parent, 
and subsidiary 12 three notches below, thus, they should have a consolidated rating one notch 
below the parent. Even though, BPI rates them with the parent’s rating. 
The third group (Holding C) operates mainly in the farming and industry, but has recently 
started to operate in the distribution sector. In the consolidated accounts, there are four 
companies with percentage of ownership between 50% and 90% - the holding owns 50/51% of 
two of those and 80% of the other two subsidiaries. Furthermore, the companies are not 
immediately associated to the group, thus, the consequences of one brand’s deterioration can 
be managed in order to not spread across the group. Moreover, except for the one in the 
distribution sector, that is still not fully integrated, the other three companies are strategically 
important for the parent. Finally, they are all responsible for less than 25% of the holding’s 
EBITDA, have been supported by the holding, and share the same main investors – the parent 
company has been financing the growth of the subsidiaries. Consequently, three of them lie in 
the partial support area, and one in the full support. Following our model, the last should have 
the rating of the parent. In the other cases, there is: subsidiary 1 with a stand-alone profile equal 
to the parent, thus, resulting in the same credit rating; subsidiary 2 that would be rated three 
notches below the parent if based on its stand-alone profile, and so, one notch below following 
our model; and subsidiary 4 with a stand-alone initial rating four notches above the parent, 
which here translates in the same rating as the holding. BPI rates all these companies (holding 
and subsidiaries) in the same way. As such, in this third case there is just one rating not 
consistent between our model and what is being done. 
The fourth group (Holding D) belongs to the agri-food industry and most of its subsidiaries 
are detained at more than 90%, having just five below that value. From these, four have a 
participation just slightly above 50% and one slightly above 60%. In respect to brand risk, four 
of them are associated to the group’s name, although the consequences of troubles in one can 
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be managed to not influence the others, and one is not so linked due to operating in a different 
sector. Those four companies are also strategically in-line with the group. Finally, all of them 
are responsible for less than 25% of the group’s EBITDA, have been financial supported by the 
parent, and share the same main investors. Thus, three of the subsidiaries’ model scores (1, 4 
and 5) are in the intermediate area, one below 0.5 (subsidiary 2) which translates in a stand-
alone based rating, and one equal to 1.2 (subsidiary 3) which means that it should have the 
parent’s rating. Subsidiaries 1 to 3 have a stand-alone credit rating equal to the holding (E3), 
and so, that is the final rating as well. Subsidiaries 4 and 5 have an individual credit profile 
stronger than the holding, and so, the final rating of our model is also the E3 for both of them. 
BPI ratings for this group are consistent with our results. 
The fifth group (Holding E) operates mainly in the four sectors: energy, transportation, 
tourism, and distribution of food products. Eight of the subsidiaries of this group do not belong 
to the extreme cases referred above and need to be analysed in our model. Holding E owns 
between 80 and 89% of five of those, between 60 and 80% of two, and 50.50% of the other one. 
Additionally, except for one that has a close name, the subsidiaries’ names are not directly 
associated to the group and to each other, and consequently, if one defaults the risk of 
reputational contagion can be managed.  Considering the strategic fit, all of them are integrated 
in the group’s vision and strategy, and at the operating level, most of them are responsible for 
less than 25% of the holding’s EBITDA. Finally, the subsidiaries have been historically 
financial supported by the parent and, although some of them share the same investors, the 
subsidiaries got most of their credit from different banks. This results in five companies in the 
full support area – getting the same rating of the holding – and three in the partial support. Since 
BPI does not rate the companies that lie in the partial support area, there was no way we could 
get the stand-alone credit rating, nor compare our results with actual BPI’s results. 
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The sixth group (Holding F) is divided into five sub-holdings: global (most of the 
businesses in telecommunications), industry, tourism, real estate, and other participations. 
Except for the global, owned at 85%, all of the others are owned at 100%, and so, should have 
the same rating of the holding F. Besides that, the sub-holding that has a participation of 85%, 
following our model, has all of the characteristics to be considered in the full support, thus, 
sharing the same rating of holding F. Then, we analysed the critical companies that belong to 
each of these sub-holdings. The results are evenly divided in full and partial support. Most of 
the last cases are due to low participation and reduced strategic and brand linkage in the case 
of the participations’ sub-holding. However, BPI does not rate most of these critical companies, 
and so, we cannot make a comparison. The only three that lie in the partial support area and 
that are rated by the bank, show the same rating of the holding, either using our model or what 
BPI is doing. 
The seventh group analysed (Holding G) is present in five areas of activity: construction, 
concessions, rental property, services, and industrial. These five sub-holdings are all owned at 
more than 90%, and so, they should have the same rating as the holding G. As such, the analysis 
concerned the subsequent subsidiaries. All of these companies are detained at more than 60%, 
do not share the name of the sub-holding, although having some degree of linkage, are 
strategically integrated in the respective sub-holding business, are responsible for less than 25% 
of the group’s EBITDA, have been financially supported by the holding or the sub-holding, and 
share the main investors. This results in having all the companies in the full support zone, and 
consequently, getting the same rating as the holding. BPI also reached this conclusion with its 
actual method, giving the same E6 rating for the holding and all the subsidiaries. 
The last group (Holding H), and also the most complex one due to its structure, is divided 
by geographical area (consolidated accounts for each one), and subsequently, by sector: 
engineering and construction, and environment and services. For the purpose of this paper we 
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analysed the sub-holdings and subsidiaries of this group in Africa and Europe. Note that there 
are a lot of degrees in this group’s chart, and a lot of companies that are owned at less than 90% 
by the sub-holdings that are also detained at less than 90% by the Holding H. As such, we 
analysed the relationship of each company not with the Holding H but with the company that 
is immediately above in the group’s structure, and the final rating is compared to that one above 
and not to the whole group’s rating. From the reports analysed, we got that all the companies 
are strategically integrated in the group and subgroups’ businesses, they all are responsible for 
less than 25% of the EBITDA, and have been financially supported inside the group. Besides 
that, some of them share the name of the company they belong to, and others are related but not 
so directly. Finally, the participation percentage varies from 50 to 90%: in Africa, the 
considered companies are all owned at 50-60%; in Europe most of them are owned at 60-80%. 
From our model, the companies that needed to be tested in the African branch lie all in the 
partial support area, and the ones in the European side are mainly in the full support area, with 
three exceptions in twenty-two analysed. BPI does not give ratings for most of the companies 
considered. From the seven possible to compare, the ratings we got are almost the same as the 
ones BPI actually gives. The only exception is subsidiary 13 that belongs to the European sub-
holding, which is an E7, and lies in the full support area, and so, should be rated in the same 
way. However, its stand-alone rating is an E3 and BPI rates it as an E4, as well as most of its 
subsidiaries (that are not included because they are detained at more than 90%). Note that even 
if the subsidiary was in the partial support area, our model would give it an E7 since its stand-
alone profile is stronger than the holding’s profile. 
 In most of the cases analysed, the conclusions that we got from our model are the same 






The goal of this paper is to provide a practical solution for BPI’s worry about how to give 
ratings to different companies inside the same group. This involves identifying the determinants 
of a holding-subsidiary financial relationship, as well as model them in a way we can extract 
the subsidiaries’ rating from the holding’s rating and that relationship or, at least, make the 
necessary adjustments to the subsidiaries’ stand-alone rating. 
For this purpose, we started by analysing what is being done by the major rating companies 
in the world. In this first chapter we concluded that most of them focus on the strategic 
relationship between the companies, although some also give importance to the operational 
factors. Moreover, Moody’s has a model for industrials where it presents specific weights for 
each of the factors considered. From this starting point we got into a model design where we 
decided to include six factors, here sorted from the most to the least important and weighted: 
ownership, strategic fit, operational fit, reputational/brand risk, treasury (financing sources), 
and track record. Note that since we considered less factors than Moody’s, the weights were 
adapted and decided in a trial and error basis through the model analysis in order to get rating 
consistency. Besides that, the model just applies to groups of companies that present 
consolidated financial statements, where there is not total ring-fencing, and where the holding 
owns between 50 and 90% of the subsidiary in analysis. Finally, the model is supposed to give 
results between zero and two which translates in weak, intermediate, and strong relationships, 
and respectively to no support, partial support, and full support upon financial distress periods. 
The first result originates a stand-alone based rating, the second some adjustments on the stand-
alone rating of the subsidiary, and the last the same rating for both the holding and the 
subsidiary. The scale to apply each of these results comes from the fact that, in practice, if the 
companies belong to the same group, most of them should lie in the full support area, and as it 
goes to the opposite extreme, the less companies we should have. 
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Afterwards, we tested the model by applying it to eight groups of companies whose holding 
is a BPI’s client, across different industries and with different organizational structures, and 
compared the ratings with the ones given by the bank. 
It is important to start by stating that we found some limitations of this model. First of all, 
the model might look simplistic since it includes just six factors and there are a lot of details in 
a parent-subsidiary relationship. Nevertheless, the more complex, the less practical applicability 
a model has. Secondly, the brand/reputational risk might look too subjective since I can easily 
associate two brands that another person does not know that belong to the same group. Still, 
this analysis must be done by specialized people who really know the corporate group, just like 
all the subjective factors’ analysis of the internal rating models of any financial institution. 
Thirdly, since it is a model to be applied to each subsidiary it seems to be too time-consuming. 
Yet, if considering just the subsidiaries detained at less than 90%, it seems reasonable and worth 
it. Fourthly, in the cases analysed in this report, there are three factors that almost do not vary: 
operational fit, track record, and financing sources. Theoretically we still think that they are 
important just how we explained in the model design section. However, we analysed huge 
groups of companies, and so, it is understandable that most of them are responsible just for a 
small portion of the group’s EBITDA. Besides that, if the subsidiaries belong to the group, the 
probability of having been supported by the holding is big, and otherwise they would already 
have been sold and not included in the consolidated financial statements anymore. Finally, 
Portugal is a small country, where there are not a lot of big investors and where the companies 
are not used to go to the financial markets to get financed. Thus, most of the companies across 
the country (and consequently, the ones we analysed) get financed in the same places, sharing 
the same main investors.  
Furthermore, note that this is a theoretical model, and it is still in need to go through the 
econometric analysis to find the optimal weights and cut-offs before it can be applied in reality. 
20 
 
However, this matter is not under this department’s responsibility, therefore, it did not take part 
on this paper, which is also a limitation of the model analysis presented above. 
Then, throughout this analysis, a lot of companies lie in the partial support area and that is 
counterintuitive since they belong to the same group and so should have some important 
operational and/or strategical linkage with each other. Nonetheless, we have to keep in mind 
that most of the companies of each group are not even considered and used in this model since 
the parent owns more than 90%, and those have the same rating as the parent. 
Finally, there were a lot of cases where the comparison between our model’s results and 
the bank’s effective rating was not possible due to the fact that the subsidiaries concerned are 
not clients of BPI. 
Summing up, the model we propose is accurate to, ultimately and through the rating scale, 
measure the probabilities of default inside a corporate group. The stronger the holding-
subsidiary relationship, the closer will their ratings be since they will provide financial support 
to each other in case of financial distress, as long as they are able to do it, and so prevent the 
default. As such, in limit, they will have the same probability of default, which is the case where 
the relationship is so in line that every time the parent can help, it will for sure, and so, the 
subsidiary will just default when the parent is also in default and has no ability to help. Our 
model measures this and gives results close to the ones BPI has been getting internally, which 
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Model Analysis Results – Holding A 
 
 





















Subsidiary 1 3 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 3 4
Subsidiary 2 3 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 3
Subsidiary 3 3 1 0 0 0 2 2 0.6 3
Subsidiary 4 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 3 4
Subsidiary 5 3 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 3 3
Subsidiary 6 3 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 3 3
Subsidiary 7 3 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 3
Subsidiary 8 6 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 4 4
Subsidiary 9 3 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 3 4
Subsidiary 10 3 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 3
Subsidiary 11 3 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 3
Subsidiary 12 3 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 3





















Subsidiary 1 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5 5
Subsidiary 2 3 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5 5
Subsidiary 3 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5
Subsidiary 4 6 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5 5
Subsidiary 5 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5 5
Subsidiary 6 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5 5
Subsidiary 7 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5
Subsidiary 8 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5
Subsidiary 9 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5
Subsidiary 10 4 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5 5
Subsidiary 11 5 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 5
Subsidiary 12 8 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 6 5
Subsidiary 13 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5
Subsidiary 14 4 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5 5
Subsidiary 15 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5 5
Subsidiary 16 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5
Subsidiary 17 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5 5
Subsidiary 18 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5
Subsidiary 19 7 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 6 5
Subsidiary 20 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5 5
Subsidiary 21 5 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 5
Subsidiary 22 7 0 2 1 0 2 2 0.75 6 5
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Model Analysis Results – Holding C 
 
 
Model Analysis Results – Holding D 
 
 




























Subsidiary 1 7 0 1 2 0 2 2 0.9 7 7
Subsidiary 2 10 0 1 2 0 2 2 0.9 8 7
Subsidiary 3 7 2 1 2 0 2 2 1.5 7 7




















Subsidiary 1 3 0 1 2 0 2 2 0.9 3
Subsidiary 2 3 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.3 3 3
Subsidiary 3 3 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 3 3
Subsidiary 4 1 0 1 2 0 2 2 0.9 3 3




















Subsidiary 1 6 2 2 2 1 2 1 1.7 6 6
Subsidiary 2 6 2 1 2 0 2 1 1.4 6 6
Subsidiary 3 6 2 1 2 0 2 1 1.4 6 6
Subsidiary 4 6 2 1 2 0 2 1 1.4 6 6
Subsidiary 5 6 2 1 2 1 2 1 1.6 6 6
Subsidiary 6 6 1 1 2 0 2 1 1.1 6
Subsidiary 7 6 1 1 2 0 2 1 1.1 6
Subsidiary 8 6 0 1 2 0 2 1 0.8 6
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Subsidiary 1 8 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 8
Subsidiary 2 8 2 1 2 0 2 2 1.5 8
Subsidiary 3 8 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 8
Subsidiary 4 5 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 8
Subsidiary 5 8 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 8
Subsidiary 6 8 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 8
Subsidiary 7 8 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 8
Subsidiary 8 8 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 8
Subsidiary 9 4 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 8 8
Subsidiary 10 8 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 8 8
Sub-holding Industry 8
Subsidiary 11 8 0 1 2 0 2 2 0.9 8
Subsidiary 12 8 0 1 2 0 2 2 0.9 8
Subsidiary 13 8 0 1 2 0 2 2 0.9 8
Subsidiary 14 8 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 8
Subsidiary 15 8 2 1 2 0 2 2 1.5 8 8
Subsidiary 16 8 2 1 2 0 2 2 1.5 8 8
Subsidiary 17 8 2 1 2 0 2 2 1.5 8
Subsidiary 18 8 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 8
Subsidiary 19 8 2 1 2 0 2 2 1.5 8
Subsidiary 20 8 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 8 8
Subsidiary 21 8 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 8
Subsidiary 22 8 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 8
Subsidiary 23 8 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 8
Subsidiary 24 8 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 8 8
Subsidiary 25 8 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 8
Subsidiary 26 8 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 8
Subsidiary 27 8 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 8
Subsidiary 28 8 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 8
Subsidiary 29 8 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 8 8
Subsidiary 30 8 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 8 8
Sub-holding participations 8
Subsidiary 31 8 0 0 1 0 2 2 0.6 8
Subsidiary 32 8 2 0 1 0 2 2 1.2 8
Subsidiary 33 8 0 0 1 0 2 2 0.6 8
Subsidiary 34 8 0 0 1 0 2 2 0.6 8
Subsidiary 35 8 0 0 1 0 2 2 0.6 8
Subsidiary 36 8 0 0 1 0 2 2 0.6 8
Subsidiary 37 8 0 0 1 0 2 2 0.6 8
Subsidiary 38 3 0 0 1 0 2 2 0.6 8 8
Subsidiary 39 2 0 0 1 0 2 2 0.6 8 8
Subsidiary 40 8 1 0 1 0 2 2 0.9 8
Sub-holding Tourism 8
Subsidiary 41 8 1 0 1 0 2 2 0.9 8
Subsidiary 42 8 2 0 1 0 2 2 1.2 8
Subsidiary 43 8 0 0 1 0 2 2 0.6 8
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Model Analysis Results – Holding G 
 
 






















Subsidiary 1 6 2 1 2 0 2 2 1.5 6
Subsidiary 2 6 2 1 2 0 2 2 1.5 6
Subsidiary 3 6 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 6
Subsidiary 4 6 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 6
Subsidiary 5 6 2 1 2 0 2 2 1.5 6























Subsidiary 1 7 0 2 2 0 2 2 1 7
Subsidiary 2 7 0 1 2 0 2 2 0.9 7
Subsidiary 3 7 0 1 2 0 2 2 0.9 7




Subsidiary 5 7 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 7
Subsidiary 6 7 1 2 2 0 2 2 1.3 7
Subsidiary 7 7 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 7
Subsidiary 8 7 2 1 2 0 2 2 1.5 7
Subsidiary 9 7 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 7 7
Subsidiary 10 7 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 7
Subsidiary 11 7 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 7
Subsidiary 12 7 0 1 2 0 2 2 0.9 7
Subsidiary 13 3 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 7 4
Subsidiary 14 7 0 1 2 0 2 2 0.9 7 7
Subsidiary 15 7 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 7 7
Subsidiary 16 1 0 1 2 0 2 2 0.9 7 7
Subsidiary 17 7 1 1 2 0 2 2 1.2 7 7
Subsidiary 18 7 2 1 2 0 2 2 1.5 7
Subsidiary 19 7 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 7
Subsidiary 20 7 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 7
Subsidiary 21 7 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 7
Subsidiary 22 7 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 7
Subsidiary 23 7 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 7 7
Subsidiary 24 7 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 7
Subsidiary 25 7 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 7
Subsidiary 26 7 2 2 2 0 2 2 1.6 7
